The Creation of an Accountant Workproduct Privilege--Rendering Relevancy Irrelevant: United States v. Arthur Young & Co. by Abramow, Jill A.
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 57 
Number 2 Volume 57, Winter 1983, Number 2 Article 4 
June 2012 
The Creation of an Accountant Workproduct Privilege--Rendering 
Relevancy Irrelevant: United States v. Arthur Young & Co. 
Jill A. Abramow 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Abramow, Jill A. (1983) "The Creation of an Accountant Workproduct Privilege--Rendering Relevancy 
Irrelevant: United States v. Arthur Young & Co.," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 57 : No. 2 , Article 4. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol57/iss2/4 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
COMMENTS
THE CREATION OF AN ACCOUNTANT
WORKPRODUCT PRIVILEGE-
RENDERING RELEVANCY IRRELEVANT:
United States v. Arthur Young & Co.
Section 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code (the Code) autho-
rizes the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to issue a summons re-
questing the production of any books, papers, or data which may
be relevant to an investigation of a particular taxpayer's tax liabil-
ity.1 The summons may be directed either at the taxpayer or at a
third party in possession of the requested documents, including
the taxpayer's accountant.2 As a result, accountants who refuse to
I.R.C. § 7602 (West 1982). Section 7602 provides in pertinent part:
For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a return
where none has been made, determining the liability of any person for any inter-
nal revenue tax or the liability at law or in equity of any transferee or fiduciary of
any person in respect of any internal revenue tax, or collecting any such liability,
the Secretary is authorized-
(1) To examine any books, papers, records or other data which may be relevant or
material to such inquiry;
(2) To summon the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any
officer or employee of such person or any person having possession, custody, or
care of books of account containing entries relating to the business of the person
liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any other person the Secretary
may deem proper, to appear before the Secretary at a time and place named in
the summons and to produce such books, papers, records, or other data, and to
give testimony, under oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry ....
Id.
, See id. § 7609(a)(2); Moses, Issuance and Enforcement of IRS Summonses Against
Third-Party Recordkeepers, 60 TAXEs 66, 68-69 (1982). The third-party recordkeepers to
whom an IRS summons may be issued include accountants, attorneys, trust companies, bro-
kers, and banks. I.R.C. § 7609(a)(3). Prior to the enactment of section 7609 in 1976, the
taxpayer did not even possess the legal right to be informed of an IRS investigation of his
tax return. Moses, supra, at 68-69. The courts upheld this practice because it was usually
the third party, and not the taxpayer, who was in possession of the necessary documents.
See, e.g., United States v. Shlom, 420 F.2d 263, 266 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
1074 (1970). Today, however, the taxpayer being investigated has a right to notice of the
summons' issuance within 3 days of its service upon the third party, as well as a right to
intervene in any proceeding resulting from enforcement of the summons. See I.R.C. § 7609.
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surrender summoned material often become involved in litigation
with the IRS.' Particularly controversial has been the question
whether an accountant may resist an IRS demand for production
of "tax accrual workpapers. ' ' 4 These workpapers, which are not
used in the preparation of tax returns, but may contain the ac-
countant's candid interviews, opinions, and judgments, are pre-
pared by an accountant in verifying a corporate entity's estimate
of its contingent tax liability.5 Notwithstanding the broad interpre-
3 See, e.g., United States v. Price Waterhouse & Co., 515 F. Supp. 996, 998 (N.D. Ill.
1981); United States v. Goldman, 453 F. Supp. 508, 510 (C.D. Cal. 1978), aff'd, 637 F.2d 664
(9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 413 F. Supp. 942, 944 (D. Colo. 1975),
afl'd, 550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977).
4 See Caplin, IRS Toughens its Stance on Summoning Accountant's Tax Accrual
Workpapers, 53 J. TAx'N 130, 130 (1980). The existing controversy between the accounting
profession and the IRS primarily concerns the question whether the tax accrual workpapers
are sufficiently relevant as to permit their procurement by the IRS. Id. The inherently sen-
sitive nature of these particular papers serves to inspire continued conflict. Id. Indeed, tax
accrual workpapers often contain material that reflects the mental processes utilized by an
accountant in his preparation of tax returns. Id.; see infra note 5. See generally Note, Gov-
ernment Access to Corporate Documents and Auditors Workpapers: Shall We Include Au-
ditors Among the Privileged Few?, 2 J. CoRP. L. 349, 356 (1977). An examination of the
cases dealing with this conflict reveals disparate judicial views. Compare United States v.
Goldman, 453 F. Supp. 508, 512 (C.D. Cal. 1978) (court denied enforcement of summons
requesting taxpayer's accountant to produce documents and give testimony relating to tax
years under investigation), aff'd, 637 F.2d 664 (9th Cir. 1980) and United States v. Coopers
& Lybrand, 413 F. Supp. 942, 954 (D. Colo. 1975) (judicial enforcement of summons to
produce tax accrual papers denied), aff'd, 550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977) with United States
v. Price Waterhouse & Co., 515 F. Supp. 996, 999 (N.D. IlM 1981) (court granted access to
tax accrual papers) and United States v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 474 F. Supp. 322, 332 (D.
Mass. 1979) (court compelled production of tax accrual workpapers), appeal dismissed, 623
F.2d 720 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1021 (1980). Although the Second Circuit did not
specifically address the issue of tax accrual workpapers in United States v. Noall, 587 F.2d
123, 123 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979), its rationale has been used to
uphold IRS summonses requesting production of such documents, see, e.g., United States v.
Arthur Andersen & Co., 474 F. Supp. at 330.
5 See 1 INT. R.v. MAN. (CCH) § 4024.2(3), at 7019 (1981). The accountant's tax accrual
workpapers, which also are referred to as the tax pool analysis, tax cushion, or tax contin-
gency reserve, reflect an estimation of a company's contingent tax liability. Id. The objective
of the accountant in preparing these papers is to obtain a reasonable estimate of the income
tax attributable to all items of income and expense, and of the accrued balance necessary to
cover estimated tax liabilities. Id. Tax accrual workpapers may include:
(a) A summary of the transactions recorded in the taxpayer's general ledger with
respect to income tax accounts;
(b) A computation of the tax provision for the current year, whether or not the tax
is payable in that year; and
(c) A memorandum discussing items reflected in the financial statements as in-
come or expense where the ultimate tax treatment is unclear.
Id. In addition, the tax accrual workpapers may contain candid interviews, opinions, and
judgments of the auditors which might identify specific items of questionable deductions
19831
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tation traditionally afforded section 7602 by the federal judiciary,'
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v. Arthur
Young & Co.,7 recently created an accountant workproduct privi-
lege, holding that absent a sufficient showing of need by the IRS,
tax accrual workpapers prepared by an accountant need not be re-
leased to the IRS.'
In Arthur Young, an IRS summons was issued to the account-
ing firm of Arthur Young & Co. (Arthur Young), which had served
as independent auditor to the Amerada Hess Corporation (Amer-
ada) since 1971.9 The summons, which requested the production of
all firm files relating to Amerada,10 was issued as part of an IRS
criminal investigation of the tax returns prepared by Amerada
claimed by the taxpayer for the relevant tax years. Brief for Appellee at 8, United States v.
Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1982). Moreover, the tax accrual workpapers may
set forth a series of positions which the auditor believes the IRS may take with respect to
his client, as well as notes taken from confidential conversations with company clients. 677
F.2d at 217. These papers also may include the auditor's speculations and opinions as to his
client's views on particular tax issues. Amicus curiae (A.I.C.P.A.) brief at 10, United States
v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1982). It should be noted that disclosure of
these opinions may prejudice the taxpayer in its negotiations with the IRS concerning tax
liability. Id. For a general discussion on tax accrual workpapers, see United States v. El
Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 534-35 (5th Cir. 1982).
O See, e.g., United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707, 719 (1980) (summons for exemplar of
taxpayer's handwriting enforced); United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 319
(1978) (IRS summons enforced although sole motive was to obtain criminal evidence);
United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 150 (1975) (enforcement of John Doe summons
upheld); Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 536 (1971) (summons issued in further-
ance of an investigation, which could have resulted in criminal prosecution, is permissible,
provided that its issuance is in good faith); Foster v. United States, 265 F.2d 183, 185 (2d.
Cir.) (section 7602 held to authorize IRS to issue summons for production of signature
cards, cancelled checks, and ledger sheets), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 912 (1959). In support of
the policy of interpreting section 7602 in a broad fashion, the Court in Donaldson reasoned
that "[a]ny other holding. . . would thwart and defeat the appropriate investigatory powers
that the Congress has placed in 'the Secretary or his delegate'. . . . to carry out the broad
responsibilities ... for the administration and enforcement of the internal revenue laws."
Donaldson, 400 U.S. at 533-34 (footnote omitted).
7 677 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1982).
8 Id. at 221.
1 Id. at 214. Arthur Young is a firm of certified public accountants. Id. In its capacity as
Amerada's independent auditor, the firm had reviewed the financial statements prepared by
Amerada during the years 1972 through 1974. Id. The IRS investigation of Amerada's tax
returns focused upon these fiscal years. Amicus curiae (A.I.C.P.A.) brief at 5, United States
v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1982).
10 677 F.2d at 214-15. Over 250,000 pages of documents were contained in the requested
files. Id. at 215. Included among these documents were the audit program files, the audit
workpaper files, the tax pool analysis files, and "[a]ny other information pertinent to the
audit of Amerada ... [during the years in question]." Id. at 215 n.4.
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from 1972 through 1974.11 Following Arthur Young's refusal to re-
linquish the material, a proceeding to enforce the summons was
initiated by the IRS.12 The district court ordered enforcement of
the summons which, with two exceptions, required the production
of all the requested material.13
On appeal, Arthur Young challenged the district court order
with respect to the production of the audit workpapers14 and tax
" Id. at 214. In 1976, it was learned that many American companies may have made
payments to public officials or political parties in foreign countries. See id.; Auerbach v.
Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 624, 393 N.E.2d 994, 996, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 923 (1979). Reports of
such activity prompted Amerada to initiate an internal investigation of possible wrongdoing.
677 F.2d at 214. Toward this end, a committee was formed, comprised of the company's
board of directors and assisted by several attorneys. Id. IRS interest in the findings of the
committee apparently was piqued, and a criminal investigation of Amerada's tax returns for
the years 1972 through 1974 was instituted. Id. Arthur Young & Co., meanwhile, had been
engaged in a routine audit of the corporation, the product of which was sought by the IRS
to aid in its investigation. Id. at 214-15.
12 Id. A taxpayer who receives notice that an IRS summons has been issued to a third
party in possession of information or documents relating to the taxpayer may, within 14
days of receipt of the notice, direct the third party not to comply with the summons. I.R.C.
§ 7609(b)(2). Proper notice given to both the third-party recordkeeper and the IRS will stay
the third party's compliance with the summons, and thereby preclude IRS examination of
the summoned records, absent a court order. Id. § 7609(d). The IRS then may enforce the
summons under section 7402, which provides:
If any person is summoned under the internal revenue laws to appear, to tes-
tify, or to produce books, papers, or other data, the district court of the United
States for the district in which such person resides or may be found shall have
jurisdiction by appropriate process to compel such attendance, testimony, or pro-
duction of books, papers, or other data.
Id. § 7402(b). The taxpayer has an absolute right to intervene in these proceedings. Id. §
7609(b)(1).
,3 496 F. Supp. 1152, 1160 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). The district court ordered enforcement of
the summons, thus requiring Arthur Young to release the requested material. Id. Two ex-
ceptions were made, however, insofar as the district court determined that a special commit-
tee report dealing with questionable foreign payments was protected by the attorney work-
product doctrine, and that certain audit programs were too remote to the question of tax
liability. Id. at 1157-58.
14 The audit workpapers consisted mainly of factual data derived from the attempt to
verify Amerada's financial statements. 677 F.2d at 215. The Internal Revenue Manual de-
fines audit workpapers as those used by auditors to account for "the procedures followed,
the tests performed, the information obtained, and the conclusions reached" in the verifica-
tion process. 1 INT. REV. MAN. (CCH) § 4024.2(2), at 7018 (1981). Indeed, these workpapers
provide support for the independent certified public accountant's opinion regarding the fair-
ness of a taxpayer's financial statements. Id. In Arthur Young, the court held that these
documents satisfied the Second Circuit's relevancy test, 677 F.2d at 218-19; see infra note
21, rejecting Arthur Young's argument that an enhanced burden of showing relevance is
placed upon the IRS when these documents are being sought from a third party rather than
from the taxpayer himself, 677 F.2d at 215. In addition, the court stated that it would be
anomalous to deny the IRS request for the audit workpapers when Amerada itself did not
object to their production. Id. at 216; see infra note 15.
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accrual workpapers. 1 A divided Second Circuit panel"6 affirmed
the district court's decision concerning the audit papers,17 but re-
versed the order insofar as it mandated production of the tax ac-
crual material."8 Writing for the court, Chief Judge Feinberg recog-
nized that the primary inquiry in IRS summons enforcement
proceedings is whether the IRS has satisfied the prerequisites to
enforcement which the Supreme Court delineated in United
States v. Powell,"9 including a showing that the summoned materi-
als are relevant to the investigation being conducted by the IRS.2"
25 677 F.2d at 215, 217. On appeal, Arthur Young was the sole challenger of the court's
order requiring production of the audit workpapers. Id. at 215. Although Amerada chose not
to intervene in connection with the audit workpapers, it did join Arthur Young and "a host
of amici curiae" in challenging the district court's order to release the tax accrual
workpapers. Id. at 217; see also supra note 12 (enforcement procedures).
16 Chief Judge Feinberg wrote the majority opinion in which Judge Mansfield joined.
Judge Newman filed a separate opinion, dissenting in part and concurring in part.
17 677 F.2d at 214, 217.
18 Id. at 214, 221. The Second Circuit's reversal of the district court's order with respect
to the tax accrual workpapers marks a significant departure from prior judicial decisions
which have enforced summonses requesting production of these materials. See United
States v. Price Waterhouse & Co., 515 F. Supp. 996, 999 (D. Minn. 1979); United States v.
Arthur Andersen & Co., 474 F. Supp. 322, 327, 332 (D. Mass. 1979), appeal dismissed, 623
F.2d 720 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1021 (1980). But see United States v. Coopers &
Lybrand, 413 F. Supp. 942, 951, 954 (D. Colo. 1975) (court denied enforcement of IRS sum-
mons requesting tax accrual workpapers), aff'd, 550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977). Initially, the
Arthur Young majority addressed and rejected Amerada's contention that since the sum-
mons was issued pursuant to a criminal investigation, the relevance of the tax accrual pa-
pers must be measured with respect to that investigation. 677 F.2d at 217-18. Chief Judge
Feinberg relied upon the rationale set forth by the Supreme Court in United States v.
LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 319 (1978), in which the Court held that the original
motive of an IRS agent in issuing a summons is not dispositive in all cases. Id. Furthermore,
the majority in Arthur Young observed that since an agent simply may reissue a new sum-
mons, considerations of judicial economy are also significant. 677 F.2d at 218.
1 379 U.S. 48 (1964). In Powell, a taxpayer was issued an IRS summons subsequent to
an examination of his tax returns. Id. at 49. The taxpayer contended that, absent fraud,
assessment of additional deficiencies was barred by the statute of limitations. Id. Accord-
ingly, he refused to produce the records unless the IRS disclosed its ground for suspicion of
fraud. Id. The Supreme Court granted certiorari due to intercircuit conflict regarding the
standard which must be met by the IRS prior to judicial enforcement of a summons. Id. at
50-51. In an attempt to resolve this conflict, the Court set forth the following four prerequi-
sites to enforcement: first, "that the investigation will be conducted pursuant to a legitimate
purpose"; second, "that the inquiry may be relevant to the purpose;" third, "that the infor-
mation sought is not already within the Commissioner's possession;" and finally, "that the
administrative steps required by the Code have been followed." Id. at 57-58; see Kenderine,
The Internal Revenue Service Summons To Produce Documents: Powers, Procedures, and
Taxpayer Defenses, 64 MINN. L. Rav. 73, 76-77 (1979). Notably, the Powell Court specifi-
cally stated that the IRS need not establish probable cause in order for there to be judicial
enforcement of a summons. 379 U.S. at 57.
20 677 F.2d at 218; Powell, 379 U.S. at 57; supra note 19.
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Applying the relevancy standard consistently used by the Second
Circuit, namely that the requested documents "might have thrown
light upon" the accuracy of the tax return,21 the court unanimously
concluded that the tax accrual workpapers met this low threshold
of relevance.22
Notwithstanding this determination, the majority held that a
qualified workproduct privilege attaches to tax accrual papers pre-
pared by an accountant.23 Relying primarily upon Hickman v.
Taylor,24 in which the Supreme Court declared that an attorney's
prelitigation workproduct is privileged against compelled disclo-
sure,25 the Second Circuit stated that "strong public policies [must
be balanced] against a party's need for information whenever a
conflict between the two arises."2 Chief Judge Feinberg perceived
that, with respect to the surrender of tax accrual workpapers, a
conflict exists between society's interest in the proper collection of
tax revenues and the investing public's interest in corporate com-
21 E.g., Foster v. United States, 265 F.2d 183, 187 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 912
(1959); see United States v. Acker, 325 F. Supp. 857, 862 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). In Foster, the
Second Circuit espoused a policy of affording a broad interpretation to the section 7602
summons power. See 265 F.2d at 186-87. The court declared that "relevancy" as it relates to
an IRS summons should be determined in essentially the same manner as "materiality" is
determined in relation to grand jury investigations. Id. Thus, the summoned material is
relevant, according to the court, if it "might have thrown light upon" the IRS' investigation
of the taxpayer's tax returns. Id. at 187. This standard consistently has been used by the
Second Circuit in considering whether the IRS has satisfied the Powell criteria. See, e.g.,
United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211, 218 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v.
Shlom, 420 F.2d 263, 265 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1074 (1970).
2 677 F.2d at 218-19. Judge Newman, though dissenting from that part of the majority
opinion creating an accountant workproduct privilege, concurred in the determination that
the tax accrual workpapers were relevant to the IRS audit of Amerada. Id. at 221 n.1 (New-
man, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
23 Id. at 221.
24 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
21 Id. at 510-11; see infra notes 42-46. The Second Circuit, in addition to relying on
Hickman itself, also relied upon Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which incorporates the doctrine enunciated in Hickman. 677 F.2d at 219; see FED. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(3). Rule 26 provides:
[A] party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things.., prepared in
anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party ... only upon a show-
ing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials and that
he is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the
materials by other means. In ordering discovery of such materials ... the court
shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions,
or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the
litigation.
11 677 F.2d at 219.
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pliance with disclosure requirements imposed by the securities
laws. The court conceded that access to tax accrual workpapers
would enhance the government's ability to collect corporate
taxes. 28 The majority observed, however, that such unrestricted ac-
cess also would discourage full disclosure of information which,
though vital to accurate financial assessments, 9 may be perceived
by the corporate taxpayer as potentially damaging to the com-
pany.30 Thus, the court reasoned, the investing public would be
provided with inaccurate financial information upon which to base
its investment decisions.31 Balancing these countervailing interests,
the court fashioned a workproduct privilege which, Chief Judge
Feinberg concluded, would protect the investing public's interest
in enforcement of the securities laws and would permit the IRS to
obtain information upon "a sufficient showing of need. ' '32
Dissenting in part, Judge Newman contended that the crea-
tion of an accountant workproduct privilege is more appropriately
27 Id. The majority's examination of the federal securities laws focused primarily upon
the disclosure requirements of sections 781 and 78m of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(the '34 Act). Id.; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 781-78m (1976). The '34 Act, a legislative response to the
stock market crash of 1929, was intended to regulate the securities industry in order to
protect investors against price manipulation. See W. KNEPPER, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OF-
FICERS AND DIRECTORS 275 (3d ed. 1978). Under the '34 Act, any corporation which desires
listing on a national securities exchange is required to comply with several disclosure re-
quirements. 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1976). Pursuant to these requirements, the corporation must
file with the Securities Exchange Commission certain financial statements that have been
verified by independent auditors "in accordance with generally accepted auditing stan-
dards." 17 C.F.R. § 210.1-02(d) (1982). These statements contain the financial data upon
which the investing public must rely in its appraisal of the corporation. See H. KRiEKs, THE
SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH OF A PURPOSE 142-43 (1979). To a
great extent, therefore, the investing public is dependent upon the accountant's verification
of these statements and upon the accounting methods utilized in the process. See generally
id. This dependence is heightened by the fact that "[a]ccounting is not discovered but in-
stead is an agreed-on set of techniques whose selection legislates its meaning and prima
facie determines how we are permitted to see the world. Its correctness and its usefulness
depend on what one wants to achieve." Id. at 143.
28 See 677 F.2d at 219-20.
2 Id. at 219. The majority reasoned that inherent in the '34 Act's verification proce-
dures is the requirement that there be a free flow of information between the management
of the subject corporation and the auditors. Id. The ultimate result, it is hoped, is a "fair
and honest" securities market. See id.
3o Id. at 220. The court reasoned that the flexible nature of the federal tax laws requires
a relationship between the accountant-auditor and the corporate taxpayer that encourages
the exchange of confidences regarding possible tax liability. See id. Chief Judge Feinberg
stated that the potential for disclosure of this information to the IRS necessarily would
inhibit this free exchange. See id.
"1 Id. at 220-21.
32 Id. at 221.
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a matter of congressional than judicial concern. 33 Furthermore,
Judge Newman rejected the policy argument advanced by the ma-
jority, asserting that it "rests on an indictment of corporate
America. ' 34 The dissent stated that although some corporations
may be tempted to violate their obligations under the securities
laws, it is not the responsibility of the court to furnish them with a
shield behind which to do so. 5 Finally, Judge Newman observed,
the certified public accountant is responsible to the public as well
as to his client, and thus, contrary to the majority's opinion, the
accountant and attorney workproduct privileges are not
analogous.3
Although the Second Circuit in Arthur Young apparently has
attempted both to limit the power of the IRS and to encourage full
compliance with the federal securities laws, it is suggested that the
privilege recognized by the court for the tax accrual workpapers
commands a result unduly restrictive of the IRS summons power.
This Comment will examine the Second Circuit's rationale for cre-
ating an accountant workproduct privilege and, after identifying
the weaknesses in its reasoning, will suggest an alternative ap-
proach to the blanket privilege granted by the Arthur Young
court.
Id. at 221-22 (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Newman
questioned the majority's very authority to create an accountant's workproduct privilege,
and concluded that it was unlikely that even Congress would act to create such a privilege.
Id. at 222-23 (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Indeed, an accountant-client privilege that would preclude production of an account-
ants workproduct was not recognized at common law. See, e.g., United States v. Bowman,
358 F.2d 421, 423 (3d Cir. 1966); United States v. Kelly, 311 F. Supp. 1216, 1217 (E.D. Pa.
1969); In re Rashba & Pokart, 271 F. Supp. 946, 948 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
Moreover, the federal courts consistently have refused to recognize any judicially cre-
ated privilege between an accountant and his client. Couch v. United States, 509 U.S. 322,
335 (1973); United States v. Arthur Andersen, 474 F. Supp. 322, 326-27 (D. Mass. 1979),
appeal dismissed, 623 F.2d 725, 729 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1021 (1980). It must be
noted, however, that more than 15 jurisdictions have accorded a statutory accountant-client
privilege. See Note, Government Access to Corporate Documents and Auditor's
Workpapers: Shall We Include Auditors Among the Privileged Few?, 2 J. CoRP. L. 349, 369
n.121 (1979); see also, Katsoris, Confidential Communications: The Accountant's Dilemma,
35 FORDHAM L. REv. 51, 67-68 (1966) (discussing accountant-client privilege statutes).
677 F.2d at 223 (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
35 Id. (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
31 Id. at 224 (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Hickman v. Taylor-THE CREATION OF THE ATTORNEY
WORKPRODUCT DOCTRINE
The Second Circuit interpreted the Supreme Court's decision
in Hickman v. Taylor to mandate a balancing of interests when-
ever a conflict arises between a strong public policy and a party's
need for information. 7 Close examination of Hickman reveals,
however, that the Supreme Court never contemplated such an
analysis.
In Hickman, the plaintiff's counsel sought discovery of materi-
als obtained by the defense counsel in anticipation of litigation,
including statements of witnesses and documents reflecting various
thoughts of the defendant's attorney.38 While the plaintiff argued
that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure afforded him access to
the requested materials, 9 the defendant asserted that the attor-
ney-client privilege insulated the information from compelled dis-
closure.40 After examining the intended scope of rule 26 of the Fed-
37 Id. at 219.
3829 U.S. at 498-99. In Hickman, the plaintiff brought suit against the defendant tug
owners to recover damages on behalf of a deceased crew member. Id. at 498. In anticipation
of the litigation, the defendant's counsel interviewed and took statements from several sur-
vivors and witnesses of the accident which gave rise to the plaintiff's claim. Id. Subsequent
to the commencement of the action, the plaintiff's attorney filed a number of interrogatories
directed at the tug owners, seeking copies and summaries of any records, reports, state-
ments, or other memoranda relating to the accident. Id. at 498-99. The defendants, through
their counsel, declined to comply with the requests, asserting that to do so would be to
reveal privileged information and, "almost, the thoughts of counsel." Id. at 499.
1, Id. at 501-02. The plaintiff in Hickman originally believed that, in issuing his inter-
rogatories to the defendant, he was proceeding under Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Id. at 501. It became apparent, however, that he actually was invoking rule 26.
Id. at 502. At the time, rule 26 provided that any party may take the testimony of any
person by deposition or by written interrogatories for the purpose of discovery or for the
procurement of evidence, and that the deponent's examination may pertain to any matter
involved in the pending action as long as such matter is not privileged. See id. at 503; FED.
R. Civ. P. 26(a)-(b)(1).
40 See 329 U.S. at 499. The attorney-client privilege, claimed by the defendant as a
defense against disclosure of the requested material, is the oldest of the privileges protecting
confidential communications. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2290, at 542-43 (J. McNaughton
rev. ed. 1961). The privilege was created in furtherance of the "oath and honor" of the
attorney, since it was considered the duty of the attorney to keep his client's secrets. Id. As
the "judicial search for the truth" evolved, however, the privilege came to be regarded as
that of the client. Id. The purpose of this privilege is to promote a free flow of information
between the attorney and his client without the fear of subsequent, compelled disclosure.
See Note, supra note 4, at 360. Candid communication, in turn, would enable the attorney
to represent his client more effectively. Id. It has been stated that although withholding
relevant information may be somewhat detrimental to the judicial system, the benefits to
the client and to society outweigh such risks. See United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530,
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eral Rules,4 ' the Court determined that this rule or, for that
matter, "even the most liberal of discovery theories," does not jus-
tify unwarranted excursions into the "workproduct of the attor-
ney."'42 The Court observed, however, that such a result obtains
not because the workproduct represents privileged matter,43 but
rather because "it falls outside the arena of discovery and contra-
venes the public policy underlying the orderly prosecution and de-
fense of legal claims."4 4 Indeed, the Court stated, to permit discov-
ery of an attorney's workproduct as an absolute right would unduly
hinder the historical and necessary means by which an attorney
fulfills the interests of his client and of society.45 Thus, the Hick-
man Court concluded that the requested material did not fall
within the contemplated ambit of rule 26.46
538-39 (5th Cir. 1982); C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 87, at 175 (E.
Cleary 2d ed. 1972). The general principles underlying the attorney-client privilege may be
summarized as follows:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal advisor
in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4)
made in confidence (5) by his client, (6) are at his instance permanently pro-
tected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, (8) except the pro-
tection be waived.
8 J. WIGMORE, supra, § 2292, at 554 (footnote. omitted) (emphasis in original); see Chirac v.
Reinicker, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 280, 294 (1826); Olender v. United States, 210 F.2d 795, 806
(9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 982 (1957); see also Cafritz v. Koslow, 167 F.2d 749,
751 (D.C. Cir. 1948) (mere existence of attorney-client relationship does not ipso facto es-
tablish an attorney-client privilege); infra note 43.
4' 329 U.S. at 509-10.
41 Id. at 510. The "workproduct" of the attorney consists of "interviews, statements,
and memoranda, correspondence, briefs, mental impressions, personal beliefs, and countless
other tangible and intangible" means of reflecting the attorney's thoughts. Id. at 511.
"' Id. at 508-09. The Court unequivocally rejected the defendant's contention that the
requested material should benefit from the protection afforded by the traditional attorney-
client privilege. Id. at 508. Indeed, Justice Murphy stated:
[T]he protective cloak of [the attorney-client] privilege does not extend to infor-
mation which an attorney secures from a witness while acting for his client ....
Nor does this privilege concern the memoranda, briefs, communications, and other
writings prepared by counsel for his own use in prosecuting his client's case; and it
is equally unrelated to writings which reflect an attorney's mental impressions,
conclusions, opinions, or legal theories.
Id.
44 Id. at 510-11.
4' See id. The Court observed that as an officer of the court, a lawyer is bound to
protect his client's interests, and at the same time has obligations to work for the "advance-
ment of justice." Id. at 510. Thus, the Court concluded, the ability to work with some degree
of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusions, is essential to the proper performance of these
obligations. Id.
46 Id. at 514. The Court decried the notion that rule 26 and other discovery rules were
not intended to allow adversaries "free scrutiny" of all the files and mental processes of
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In light of the language employed by the Court, it appears
that a balancing test is not necessarily applicable to all situations
in which a conflict exists between public policy and the need for
information.4 Indeed, the Hickman Court carefully limited the
scope of its decision to the pretrial discovery context.4 Moreover,
the Court apparently intended to afford at most a qualified privi-
lege to the workproduct produced by an attorney during that par-
ticular stage of a lawsuit.4 9
fellow attorneys. Id. Justice Jackson, in his concurring opinion, reasoned that to allow the
plaintiff access to the subject material would extend the discovery "tool" to an unwarranted
extreme. See id. at 515-16 (Jackson, J., concurring). Indeed, Justice Jackson stated that "a
common law trial is and always should be an adversary proceeding. Discovery was hardly
intended to enable a learned profession to perform its functions either without wits or on
wits borrowed from the adversary." Id. at 516 (Jackson, J., concurring).
'" See 677 F.2d at 222 (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (there is
nothing in "Hickman v. Taylor... or Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that
requires or even permits this Court to depart from the broad command of section 7602"
(citations omitted)). In addition to reading Hickman as mandating a balance of conflicting
policy interests, the Second Circuit, like the Hickman Court, declared that a "sufficient
showing of need" would justify compelled disclosure of tax accrual workpapers. Id. at 221;
see 329 U.S. at 511. The Arthur Young court, however, again emulated the Hickman panel,
failing to supply any readily discernible criteria which would indicate that the IRS has es-
tablished the requisite need for the accountant's workpapers. 677 F.2d at 221; see 329 U.S.
at 511.
48 329 U.S. at 513-14; see United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 244 (1975) (White, J.,
concurring). In discussing the Hickman rationale, the concurrence in Nobles stated that
"the [Hickman] Court treated the matter entirely as one involving the plaintiff's entitle-
ment to pretrial discovery under the new Federal Rules." 422 U.S. at 224 (White, J., concur-
ring). Thus, it is clear that the Hickman Court did not intend the workproduct doctrine to
act either as an absolute privilege or as a means of preventing the production of evidence.
Id. at 246 (White, J., concurring); see 4 J. MOORE & J. LucAs, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 26.63[7],
at 26-387 (2d ed. 1982); 8 C. WRIGHT & A. IILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
2026 (1970).
"1 See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. at 237-38. The Hickman Court itself recog-
nized that an absolute privilege does not attach to an attorney's workproduct. See 329 U.S.
at 511; see also Note, A Balancing Approach to the Discoverability of Accountant's Tax
Liability Workpapers Under Section 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code, 60 WASH. U.L.Q.
188, 199 (1982) (the attorney workproduct doctrine "is not, strictly speaking, a privilege").
Since disclosure of this material may be had upon a sufficient showing of need by the re-
questing party, it has been implied that the Hickman Court merely created a "qualified
privilege." See Note, supra, at 199. Interestingly, however, the Hickman doctrine even has
been interpreted to be less than a qualified privilege. See, e.g., 422 U.S. at 246 (White, J.,
concurring). In his concurring opinion in Nobles, Justice White stated that the Hickman
Court did not intend to provide a privilege of any kind. Id. at 245 (White, J., concurring).
To have done so, Justice White opined, would have been to limit the potential evidentiary
use of the attorney's workproduct. Id. at 245-46. In this regard, the Hickman Court itself
seemingly did not want the workproduct doctrine to encroach upon the rules of evidence, as
it clearly stated that not all materials obtained by the adversary's counsel would be free
from discovery, especially since "[sluch ... documents [m]ay under certain circumstances,
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THE BALANCING OF INTERESTS-COLLECTION OF REVENUES VERSUS
SEC DISCLOSURE
Even assuming that the Second Circuit properly interpreted
Hickman, it is submitted that the court failed to articulate a policy
argument which would necessitate the creation of an accountant
workproduct privilege. While it is recognized that protection of the
investing public is essential, 50 the court's assumption that a pub-
licly held corporation would intentionally violate federal disclosure
regulations in order to shield itself against potential tax liability is
dubious.51 If a corporation fails to comply with the federal securi-
ties laws, it runs the risk of receiving a qualified opinion from its
auditor.52 This opinion, which is rendered if it appears that the
corporation's financial statement does not fairly represent its
financial condition, may subject the corporation to, inter alia, de-
listing from the national stock exchange and shareholder derivative
suits.5 3 Thus, contrary to the reasoning relied upon by the court, it
is unlikely that a corporate entity would disregard federal disclo-
sure obligations merely to avoid additional tax liability.5 4 More-
over, by assuming that inaccurate financial statements will be sup-
plied to the investing public, the court has questioned the
integrity, as well as the competency, of the accounting profession.55
be admissible in evidence." 329 U.S. at 511.
10 See 677 F.2d at 220-21; supra note 27.
"I See Nath, Internal Revenue Summonses for "Sensitive" Accountant's Papers, 34
VAND. L. REv. 1561, 1593 (1981). Interestingly, in United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530
(5th Cir. 1982), the corporate taxpayer asserted that disclosure of the tax accrual
workpapers would have a "chilling effect" on a company's compliance with Securities and
Exchange Commission regulations, thereby ultimately creating an adverse effect on the in-
vesting public. Id. at 544. The El Paso court, unequivocally rejecting this policy argument,
stated that "this premise [is] wholly speculative." Id.
12 See Nath, supra note 51, at 1593. The Securities and Exchange Commission will not
permit a financial statement to become effective if the accountant's opinion is qualified. Id.
Furthermore, if the qualified opinion is revealed in a public document, the corporation may
suffer many long-term effects, including the decline of public investments. See id. at 1593-
94.
13 Id. at 1593.
" See Roth, The Role of the Auditor, in CORPORATE FINANCIAL REPORTING: CONFLICTS
AND CHALLENGES 251 (J. Burton ed. 1969). The federal securities law disclosure require-
ments have influenced significantly the financial reporting carried out by corporations, due
primarily to corporate desire to avoid the inclusion of exceptions or qualifications in an
auditor's financial report. Id.; Coombe, Directors, Duties and Responsibilities: New Dimen-
sions, New Opportunities, 95 BANKING L.J. 634, 641 (1978). Indeed, it has been noted that
"the mere threat of a qualified financial statement, for whatever reason, is cause for serious
broad concern." Id.
'5 See generally A.I.C.P.A., CODIFICATION OF STATEMENTS ON AUDITING STANDARDS §
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It appears that the court's supposition is unfounded since, in addi-
tion to ethical incentives, an accountant is subject to personal lia-
bility for failure to discharge properly his professional obliga-
tions.56 In sum, it seems uncertain that affording the IRS access to
tax accrual workpapers would result in noncompliance with federal
securities regulations. 7
Clearly, the ultimate effect of the balancing analysis employed
by the Arthur Young court is the creation of a privilege which is
designed merely to promote compliance with obligations already
imposed by law.5 In addition, it is suggested that Chief Judge
Feinberg's reliance upon Hickman in this context 9 neglects two
important distinctions between the Hickman and Arthur Young
situations. In Hickman, the Supreme Court was influenced by the
adversarial nature of the relationship between the attorney and the
party requesting disclosure of material, as well as by the absence of
any legal obligation on the part of the client or a third party to
confide in the attorney.60 The relationship between an accountant
110.09, at 6 (1982) (all certified public accountants are bound by a code of ethics, which
requires strict adherence to auditing standards). The auditing standards which must be ad-
hered to by accountants have been imposed in the following manner:
Information essential for a fair representation in conformity with generally ac-
cepted accounting principles should be set forth in the financial statements. If the
financial statements . . . fail to disclose information required by generally ac-
cepted accounting principles, the auditor should express a qualified or an adverse
opinion because of departure from those principles.
Id. § 509.17, at 278. Justification for the auditor's opinion "rests on the conformity of his
examination with generally accepted auditing standards, and on his findings." Id. § 509.03,
at 213; see, e.g., Coombe, supra note 54, at 641 ("the accounting profession reluctantly has
come to the recognition that it owes a primary allegiance to the investing public and not to
the corporate entity by which it is employed"); see also 677 F.2d at 224 (Newman, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) ("[tihe certified public accountant. . . has responsi-
bilities to the public that far transcend his private employment relationship").
" See I.R.C. § 7206. It is a felony to assist wilfully in the preparation of fraudulent tax
returns. Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Egenberg, 441 F.2d 441, 444 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 994 (1971). Moreover, accountants may be subject to censure or suspension for
failure to follow generally accepted accounting principles. See Nath, supra note 51, at 1566.
" See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
8 See supra note 27.
59 See 677 F.2d at 221 (1982).
60 See 329 U.S. at 510-14. In his dissenting opinion in Arthur Young, Judge Newman
exhibited the Hickman attitude that "privileges generally are created to serve some policy,
independent of lawful obligations, that is thought to be impaired . . . ." 677 F.2d at 224
(Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Newman further explained
that while a client has no legal obligation to confide in his attorney, the law accords an
attorney-client privilege to encourage communication and, thus, to promote an efficient legal
system. Id. (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Furthermore, in Hick-
man, the Court sought to avoid both the possibility that witnesses and other subjects of an
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and the IRS, however, is nonadversarial, 1 and a corporate tax-
payer has an existing legal duty to comply with federal disclosure
regulations.2 Thus, it appears that although the Hickman Court
was responding to a legitimate policy need, the Second Circuit has
offered protection in an area which already is adequately
safeguarded.
THE STANDARD OF RELEVANCE
It is submitted that the Second Circuit's creation of an ac-
countant workproduct privilege enabled the court to circumvent
the unsettled question of whether particular information is suffi-
ciently relevant so as to subject it to the summons power of the
IRS. While it is conceded that resolution of this issue involves a
"delicate and demanding analysis of facts, research of law, and re-
flection on policy,"' 3 section 7602 itself ostensibly calls for such
treatment.6 " Moreover, in United States v. Bisceglia,5 the Su-
preme Court, after recognizing that the authority vested in the IRS
may be abused, nevertheless stated that "the solution is not to re-
strict that authority so as to undermine the efficacy of the federal
tax system . .". 2 6 It appears, however, that the Arthur Young
decision imposes such a strict limitation upon the summons power
of the IRS. 7 Hence, it is suggested that the court, instead, should
have evaluated the various relevancy standards in an attempt to
provide a workable standard which would afford protection for all
concerned parties.
Seemingly, at the core of the conflict concerning the appropri-
ate relevancy standard is the peculiar nature of the concept itself.6 8
No item is inherently relevant; the relevancy of a given item de-
attorney's investigations would become reluctant to cooperate with the attorney due to fear
of disclosure to the adversary, and the chance that an attorney would fail to keep proper
records by reason of the same fear. See 329 U.S. at 510-14.
" See infra note 96.
62 See supra note 27.
"3 United States v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 623 F.2d 725, 729 (1st Cir. 1980).
" See Note, supra note 49, at 208.
" 420 U.S. 141 (1975).
Id. at 146.
67 See supra text accompanying note 66; infra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
" See Note, supra note 49, at 208. The current relevancy requirement "provides no
inherent limits on the types of documents that the IRS may summon." Id. (footnote omit-
ted); see Nath, supra note 51, at 1574. It nonetheless has been stated that accountants most
frequently rely upon the relevancy standard when challenging an IRS summons. Nath,
supra note 51, at 1574-75.
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pends upon its relation to some other matter.6 9 Thus, to a great
degree, relevancy must be determined on a case by case basis. °
Confusion has arisen, however, by virtue of divergent interpreta-
tions of the relevancy standard.7 1 In United States v. Matras,7 2 for
example, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in refusing to en-
force a summons,73 stated that the IRS may not impose unneces-
sary burdens upon a taxpayer or accountant merely for its own
convenience.7 4 The court acknowledged the relevancy standard es-
poused by the Second Circuit, which states that the summoned
material is relevant if it "might shed light upon" the IRS investi-
gation,7 5 and interpreted this language to mean a "realistic expec-
tation rather than an idle hope" that something will be discov-
ered." Subsequently, in United States v. Noal, 77 the Second
Circuit liberalized its relevancy standard, noting that the language
of section 7602 should be accorded a broad interpretation. 8 En-
forcing an IRS summons, the court relied upon the "might have
thrown light upon" standard7 and concluded that it requires the
69 See James, Relevancy, Probability and the Law, 29 CALiF. L. REV. 689, 690 (1941).
70 See id.
7 See, e.g., United States v. Matras, 487 F.2d 1271, 1275 (8th Cir. 1973); United States
v. Giordano, 419 F.2d 564, 568 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1037 (1970). In Matras,
the court denied an IRS request for production of company-wide budgets of the taxpayer,
stating that "[t]he term 'relevant' connotes and encompasses more than 'convenience.'" 487
F.2d at 1275. The Giordano court, on the other hand, observed that if the conduct of the
IRS could be characterized as a fishing expedition, then section 7602 authorizes the Secre-
tary or his delegate to go fish. 419 F.2d at 568.
72 487 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1973).
73 Id. at 1273.
74 Id. at 1275; see United States v. Theodore, 479 F.2d 749, 754 (4th Cir. 1973). In
denying enforcement of an IRS summons, the Theodore court stated that the IRS should
not be given "unrestricted license to rummage through" an accountant's files. Id. at 754.
71 See United States v. Harrington, 388 F.2d 520, 524 (2d Cir. 1968); Foster v. United
States, 265 F.2d 183, 187 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 912 (1959); supra note 21.
76 See 487 F.2d at 1274 (quoting United States v. Harrington, 388 F.2d at 524).
77 587 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 923 (1979).
78 587 F.2d at 126. In Noall, the IRS requested the internal audit reports of the Bunge
Corporation. Id. at 124. Included in these reports were "hearsay, rumors, and opinions"
which were not used in the preparation of the company's tax returns. Id. at 125. The court
ordered their production, however, finding no significance in the argument that the papers
were not used in the preparation of the tax returns. Id. at 125-26; cf. United States v. Price
Waterhouse & Co., 515 F. Supp 996, 999 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (IRS allowed to review documents
containing opinions even though IRS already possessed documents containing factual infor-
mation); United States v. Acker, 325 F. Supp. 857, 862 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (in allowing enforce-
ment of IRS summons, court reasoned that although many of the requested documents con-
cededly were not relevant, if category as a whole "might shed light" upon the returns,
category itself will be deemed relevant).
7 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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IRS to surmount a very low threshold."
In contrast to the confusion engendered by these decisions,
the Tenth Circuit, in United States v. Coopers & Lybrand,sl af-
firmed a district court opinion which developed a more workable
relevancy standard. In Coopers, the IRS commenced an enforce-
ment proceeding in an effort to obtain, inter alia, various tax ac-
crual workpapers s2 After acknowledging the lack of reliable guide-
lines to determine whether certain information is relevant to an
IRS investigation, the district court sought to propose a viable so-
lution.s Initially, the court divided the requested documents into
two categories-factual and nonfactual8 4 According to the court,
the factual category, which is comprised primarily of records of ac-
tual corporate transactions, is implicitly relevant and therefore au-
tomatically susceptible to IRS access.8 5 The court then stated that
materials which are nonfactual in nature will not be deemed rele-
vant without further inquiry.8 6 Included in this category of mate-
rial are all documents and papers reflecting the mental processes of
the accountant.8 ' Unfortunately, the degree of need which must be
displayed by the IRS in order to procure nonfactual information
was articulated vaguely by the Coopers court.88 It is suggested,
therefore, that when the IRS attempts to obtain material falling
within the nonfactual category, it should be required to establish
that the information could not be acquired from other sources,89
and that there is a "realistic expectation" that the summoned ma-
terial would aid in its investigation."
Although the Arthur Young court was "unimpressed" with the
80 587 F.2d at 125.
81 550 F.2d 615 (10th Cir. 1977), aff'g 413 F. Supp. 942 (D. Colo. 1975).
82 413 F. Supp. at 944.
a' Id. at 950.
84 Id.
85 Id.; see also United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d at 537 (the corporate taxpayer
conceded that the IRS has a right to all factual information upon which the income tax
return is based).
86 413 F. Supp. at 952. The Coopers court stated that the IRS would be pressed to a
higher standard of relevance when it sought the production of data which did not represent
actual transactions. Id. at 950.
87 Id.; see P.T. & L. Constr. Co. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 404, 414 (1974).
88 See id. at 953. The Coopers court noted that, in order for the IRS to gain access to
nonfactual material, it must show more than merely that the documents "might shed light
upon" the investigation. Id.
89 See 1 INT. REV. MAN. (CCH) § 4024.3, at 7019 (1981).
80 See Harrington, 388 F.2d at 524.
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Coopers approach,"' close examination of the two cases indicates
that they bore identical outcomes. Indeed, in each case, the tax
accrual workpapers were protected against disclosure and were ob-
tainable by the IRS only upon a showing of a certain degree of
need.9 2 It is submitted, however, that the Arthur Young alternative
to the relevancy conundrum is less preferable than the Coopers ap-
proach. While the Coopers analysis ensures that factual informa-
tion contained in tax accrual workpapers will be available to the
IRS,9 3 the workproduct privilege promulgated by the Second Cir-
cuit shields the entire group of workpapers from the IRS access
and, invariably, conceals facts to which the IRS properly is enti-
tled.94 In addition, the Coopers approach is less inimical to the pol-
icy of minimizing the restrictions placed upon the summons power
of the IRS.9 5 Most significantly, however, the Coopers standard af-
fords adequate protection to all concerned, while simultaneously
avoiding the problems inherent in the creation of a workproduct
privilege.9"
" 677 F.2d at 219. The Arthur Young court's major disagreement with the Coopers
approach was that the documents at issue in Coopers were not used in the preparation of
the corporate tax returns. Id. It is significant, however, that the papers involved in Coopers
were prepared in order to satisfy the filing requirements imposed by the Securities Ex-
change Commission, 413 F. Supp. at 950, since these documents are of the type that the
Arthur Young court sought to protect, 677 F.2d at 214.
See 550 F.2d at 621; 677 F.2d at 221.
' See supra text accompanying note 85.
See United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 548 (5th Cir. 1982) (Garwood, J.,
dissenting); United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 150 (1975).
" See Bisceglia, 420 U.S. at 150-51.
" Research has indicated that the accounting profession does not unanimously seek the
creation of any type of accountant privilege. See Note, Functional Overlap Between the
Lawyer and Other Professionals: Its Implications for the Privileged Communications Doc-
trine, 71 YALE L.J. 1226, 1246-49 (1962). Indeed, it has been noted that "[tihe possibility of
an accountant-client privilege... is one which has not been enthusiastically embraced by
all accountants." Id. at 1248. Explaining the rationale underlying this attitude, the Execu-
tive Director of the National Society of Public Accountants has stated:
Perhaps the reason for not pushing for privileged communication for our members
practicing public accounting is the fact that much of their income is from tax
work, and they maintain a good relationship with the Internal Revenue Service.
There might be some question about cooperation and working relationships
should there be privileged communication. Usually the client will tell the agent,
"Go see my accountant." The agent would not be so amenable to this suggestion if
the accountant were privileged.
Id. (citing letter from R.E. Jennison, Executive Director, National Society of Public Ac-
countants, to the Yale Law Journal (Nov. 17, 1961) (available in Yale Law School Library);
see also Amicus Curiae (A.I.C.P.A.) brief at 25, United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677
F.2d 211, 250 (2d Cir. 1982) ("none of this is intended to suggest that the institute claims
the tax accrual workpapers should be privileged").
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CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding the broad interpretation traditionally af-
forded the IRS summons power,9" the power is not unfettered. In-
deed, the Supreme Court has characterized the summons power as
a "limited [one which] should be kept within its proper bounds."98
Unfortunately, courts have permitted the IRS to extend its power
beyond reasonable limitsf 9 Although it is the responsibility of a
reviewing court to ensure that the summoned material falls within
the purview of section 7602,100 a number of tribunals have enforced
summonses requesting production of materials which include hear-
say, rumors, mental impressions, and personal thoughts.10 1 It is
perhaps these broad judicial interpretations that led the Arthur
Young court to create an accountant workproduct privilege, which
significantly undermines the IRS summons power.102
See, e.g., United States v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 474 F. Supp. 322, 332 (D. Mass.
1979), appeal dismissed, 623 F.2d 720 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1021 (1980); see infra
note 99 and accompanying text.
'8 United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 151 (1975) (quoting McGrain v. Daugherty,
273 U.S. 135, 166 (1927)).
"1 See, e.g., United States v. Price Waterhouse & Co., 515 F. Supp. 996, 999 (N.D. Ill.
1981) (court allowed IRS to review documents of opinion even though it already possessed
documents of factual bases); United States v. Acker, 325 F. Supp. 857, 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)
(court enforced summons demanding production of entire category of documents even
though court conceded that much of the material was irrelevant).
"' See United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 153 (1975) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
The federal court system provides the recipient of an IRS summons with some protection
against governmental abuse of power. Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting). This protection, however,
is illusory "unless the federal courts are provided with a measurable standard when asked to
enforce a summons." Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting).
101 See, e.g., United States v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 474 F. Supp. 322, 332 (D. Mass.
1979), appeal dismissed, 623 F.2d 720 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1021 (1980).
101 It is interesting to note that, notwithstanding judicial extension of the IRS summons
power, the Internal Revenue Manual recently has been revised to restrict IRS access to tax
accrual workpapers prepared by accountants. See 1 INT. REV. MAN. (CCH) § 4024.4, at 7019
(1981). Section 4024.4 of the manual reads:
(1) In unusual circumstances, access may be had to the audit or tax accrual
workpapers.... [These workpapers] should normally be used only when such
factual data [needed to support the tax return] cannot be obtained from the tax-
payer's records and then only as a collateral source for factual data, access to
which should be requested with discretion and not as a manner of standard exam-
ining procedure....
(2) Unusual circumstances, for this purpose exist under the following conditions:
(a) a specific issue or issues has been identified by the examiner for
which there exists a need for additional facts; and
(b) the examiner has sought from the taxpayer all facts known to the
taxpayer relating to the identified issue(s); and
(c) the examiner has sought from the taxpayer's accountant supplemen-
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It appears that the accountant workproduct privilege, how-
ever, is too severe a limitation on the ability of the IRS to procure
relevant information which may be contained in an accountant's
tax accrual workpapers. Furthermore, the court's reliance upon the
analysis employed by the Supreme Court in fashioning the attor-
ney workproduct privilege is misplaced. Thus, in view of the dubi-
ety of and difficulties engendered by the court's creation of an ac-
countant workproduct privilege, it is submitted that the Arthur
Young panel simply should have revised the standard used to de-
termine the relevancy of information sought by the IRS. To be
sure, the relevancy touchstone utilized by the Tenth Circuit in
Coopers seemingly protects the interest of the investing public, the
major concern of the Arthur Young court, without unduly restrict-
ing the summons power of the IRS.
Jill A. Abramow
tary analysis (not necessarily contained in the workpapers) of facts re-
lating to the identified issue(s).
(3) In any case . . . the examiner should limit the request only to the portion of
the workpapers believed to be material and relevant to the examination.
Id. The guidelines for proper access to tax accrual workpapers, if followed by the IRS,
seemingly would provide a sufficient safeguard for the accountant and for the corporate
taxpayer. See id. § 4024.4. Unfortunately, the guidelines provide little protection since the
courts are not required to enforce them. In United States v. Price Waterhouse & Co., 515 F.
Supp. 996 (N.D. I1. 1981), for example, the court enforced an IRS summons, holding that
the failure of the IRS to follow the manual guidelines was not violative of the fourth Powell
criteria, which requires the IRS to adhere to certain administrative steps. Id. at 999.
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